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Abstract
Simon Szreter’s book Fertility, Class, and Gender in Britain, 1860-1940 argues that
social and economic class fails to explain the cross-sectional differences in marital fertility as
reported in the 1911 census of England and Wales. Szreter’s conclusion made the book
immediately influential, and it remains so. This finding matters a great deal for debates about the
causes of the European fertility decline of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For decades
scholars have argued whether the main forces at work were ideational or social and economic.
This note reports a simple re-analysis of Szreter’s own data, which suggests that social class does
explain cross-sectional differences in English marital fertility in 1911. 
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The 1996 publication of Simon Szreter’s Fertility, Class, and Gender brought the author acclaim 
seldom produced by any scholar's first book. The work was widely and almost uniformly positively 
reviewed. David Kertzer, for example, called it “something of a tour de force, combining a historian’s 
concern for local context, a demographer’s multivariate statistical techniques for the analysis of fertility-
history data, and a social theorist’s engagement with epistemological issues.”
1 More than one reviewer 
remarked that the book reports research sufficient in scope and quality for at least two monographs. One 
consists of a thoughtful analysis of the way the British statistical authorities thought about "class," and the 
way those notions shaped the taking of the census. The second is the subject of our discussion here. 
Szreter provides an analysis of the remarkable fertility survey undertaken as part of the 1911 Census of 
England and Wales. He argues that the “professional model” of class-based differential fertility held by 
the census officials and others at the time does not explain the actual patterns in the data. Many take 
Szreter to have demonstrated that socio-economic differences in fertility were not terribly significant in 
turn-of-the-century Britain, and that, by extension, socio-economic forces did not play a major role in the 
decline of fertility.
2 Only slightly less influential is Szreter’s positive conclusion that Britain underwent 
many simultaneous fertility transitions, each reflecting participation in a “communication community” 
rather than social class or economic status. 
   The statistical heart of the book relies on fertility measures drawn from the published fertility 
survey. This unusual exercise was published in multiple cross-classifications, allowing later scholars to 
examine differences in fertility according to the occupations of both husbands and wives. Social “class” 
reflects an amalgamation of groups of occupations. Szreter refers to the then-prevailing theory of fertility 
decline and its relationship to social class as the “professional model” and concludes, based on his 
statistical analysis that the model “fails.”  We find that, on the contrary, that the professional model 
performs well by conventional standards . Since we rely entirely on the professional model as he 
 
1 Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 28(1), Summer 1997, p.103. 
2 We located fourteen reviews of the book in scholarly journals. As of September 2010, the book had 209 citations 
on Google Scholar. The only generally negative review was by Charles Tilly, Population and Development Review 
22(3), September 1996, pp. 557-66. 3 
 
describes it, and the fertility measures he reports, the only differences at issue are statistical methods and 
interpretation of results.  Our discussion should not be taken as a rejection of Fertility, Class and Gender 
in its entirety. Much of Szreter’s argument deals with the nature of fertility control, more particularly the 
issue of spacing versus stopping. This part of the book is not affected by the results we report here. 
Moreover, we do not claim to have made our own, positive contribution to understanding the British 
fertility transition. Such a contribution would require an even more complete exploitation of the published 
tabulations than Szreter attempted, and would in any case be superseded by research based on the 
manuscript census schedules for 1911, which will soon be available to scholars. 
 
1. Class, occupation, and fertility 
  Part II of Fertility, Class and Gender is an intellectual and policy history of the making of the 
1911 fertility survey. Szreter starts from the premise that most social scientists probably share, but few 
take as seriously: that the sources from which we gather our data were themselves devised and used with 
specific purposes in mind. That is, data collection reflects a theory of social behavior. If a census reports 
considerable information on religion, for example, it is likely that those responsible for its construction 
thought religion a powerful force. Those theories inform the categories used in the sources, as well as the 
selection of people for inclusion in the study. 
  Szreter documents a growing fear about fertility decline in late-nineteenth century Britain, 
especially the fear that the “lower orders” were providing an ever-larger share of each birth cohort. These 
developments justified the expense and trouble of the special fertility survey undertaken in connection 
with the census. The manner in which the census authorities decided to publish the data reflects, as 
Szreter stresses, their understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying fertility patterns. The census 
tabulations of fertility by social class reflected a shared, almost dominant understanding of differential 
fertility at the time: fertility decline had gone furthest among the upper classes. In discussing Szreter’s 
argument and results, it is important to stress that the professional model implies regular gradations by 4 
 
                                                           
social class: Class I should have smaller families than Class II, etc. This argument is stronger than one 
that simply claims social Class I has fertility different from Class II.  
  The 1911 census organized the British population into 465 occupations. The social-class 
groupings were amalgamations of subsets of these 465 occupations. The underlying idea was really one of 
three classes: Class I, thought to be an “upper and middle class;” Class III, comprising skilled workmen; 
and Class V, the unskilled. The remaining two classes were inserted as Class II and Class IV.
3 Classes II 
and IV consisted of couples who did not fit together as naturally as is the case for the other three Classes, 
and it is not clear that they serve as anything more than intermediates. Szreter discusses several different 
groups of couples defined by their age at marriage and marital duration as of 1911, but in his analysis he 
stresses one particular group, those married at ages 20-24 in the period 1881-1885.  This is the largest 
single age-at-marriage category. By 1911, these couples were nearing the end of their reproductive lives 
but were not so old that one would have to worry much about selective mortality affecting the chances 
that higher-fertility wives would still survive.
4 
 
2. Szreter’s analysis  
  We focus on the discussion presented in Chapter Six of Fertility Class and Gender 
(entitled “A test of the coherence of the professional model of class-differential fertility 
decline”). The 1911 census published complete parity distributions for each marriage-age and 
duration category, but the occupational cross-tabulations only present the total number of 
couples and total births (and child deaths) in each age-duration category.
5  Thus Szreter works 
 
3 The system was devised by the Registrar-General, who also ran the census, and was first described in the 
Registrar-General’s Annual Report for 1911 (published in 1913) Szreter (1996, pp. 255-256). The reference to the 
key source in Szreter’s bibliography is not quite right; the proper full citation is in the list of references. 
4 We restrict our analysis in this note to the sub-population Szreter stresses. But we should note that age at marriage 
itself could reflect the influence of social class, or more broadly social and economic forces, on the desire to limit 
family size. Elsewhere in his book Szreter stresses precisely this point.  
5 One could use the parity distributions to look for heterogeneity in the way couples achieved smaller families, for 
example. Others have used the similar fertility survey from the 1911 Census of Ireland to examine questions similar 
to this one. Paul David, Warren Sanderson, and their collaborators have developed an entirely new statistical 
methodology that exploits all the information in those parity distributions for the purpose of arriving at measures of 5 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
with the mean number of children ever born (CEB). In evaluating the social-class model we need 
to bear in mind that the census reports cross-classification of fertility by occupation for a sub-set 
of occupations. The census itself counts 465 different occupations, but the fertility cross-
classifications restrict themselves to 206 occupations chosen, Szreter (1996, p. 291) reports, “for 
a combination of their quantitative importance and their specificity of occupational description.” 
They include 87.5 percent of couples enumerated in the census. Szreter argues that Classes I-V 
are graded, and thus focuses on the 176 occupations in those classes. Including Classes VI-VIII 
(which we discuss below) increases the total number of occupations to 195. 
Szreter uses these fertility measures drawn from the 176 different occupational groups to 
demonstrate that the social-class model of fertility, in his word, fails. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics 
for mean CEB in the five classes. The table confirms that fertility was graded by social class. Yet one 
could suggest, as Szreter does, that there is too much variation in CEB within each class to view them as 
distinct groups:   
A strong and relatively unequivocal corroboration for a theory of class-differentials 
would be provided by a pattern in which fertility levels of the component occupations within each 
class proved to be reasonably tightly bunched around their class mean, demonstrating that the 
classes approximated to both homogenous and discrete entities. Of course, there would be some 
outliers in each class but a high degree of continuity in the run of occupational fertility values, 
without any clustering, certainly would not conform to this kind of highly positive confirmation 
of the class-differential model. 
  Secondly, it might be found that there was no bunching of occupational fertility values 
around their class mean and correspondingly no clear separation between the graded social 
classes, as each one merged into the next. But it might still be the case that the fertility levels of 
the individual occupations followed a rank ordering more or less in accord with their graded class 
affiliations: class I occupations appearing on a rank-ordered list before those of class II and so on. 
This would be a qualified success for the professional model: class-graded rather than class-
differential fertility decline.  
  Thirdly, a still greater degree of overlap between the occupations of the adjacent graded 
classes might present itself. More than a merging at the edges, there might be such substantial 
overlapping of the fertility values recorded by many of the individual occupations drawn from 
different classes that some of the social classes could hardly be distinguished from each other in 
 
the extent and nature of fertility regulation behavior in specific birth and marriage-age cohorts. Cohort-Parity 
Analysis (CPA) compares a “model” population of couples not thought to be controlling their fertility to a “target” 
population of fertility controllers. It yields parameters that indicate the proportion of each age-duration group that is 




terms of their occupational contents, although still perhaps preserving some overall and very 
general correspondence with the professional model. This would suggest that the class-graded 
model was far from an accurate or useful summary of the occupational patterns revealed by the 
1911 census (Szreter 1996, p.298-99). 
 
Szreter refers to having examined these questions using “factor, cluster, and discriminant analysis,” but he 
does not report any statistical results in this chapter. In what follows we describe what we think would be 
the most natural way to cast his criteria as testable hypotheses into a statistical framework.
6  
Szreter’s judgment that the social-class model failed to explain fertility differentials rests on two 
main bodies of evidence. First, he plots tabulations of the mean of CEB for all observations, and argues 
that because the figures do not display “discontinuities,” they do not suggest that each social-class has its 
own fertility patterns (these are his Figures 6.2 through 6.7).  Our Figure 1 is a slight variant on his Figure 
6.6. We divide the couples into “bins” according to their mean CEB, and then graph the number of 
couples in each bin.
7  Szreter is correct: while some outcomes are more common than others, we do not 
see five different spikes in frequency corresponding to the five different classes. However, plotting the 
data a different way reveals more. Figure 2 presents smoothed distributions of mean CEB separately for 
each class, but overlaid on the same horizontal axis to facilitate comparison. Setting aside Class IV for the 
moment, we see that each class does correspond to a distinct peak in the frequency of a given mean CEB. 
The class-specific peaks we see in Figure 2 are obscured in Figure 1 by the overlaps across classes.  
Figure 2 also shows that Class IV is different. Its mean is not much larger than Class III’s, but it overlaps 
much of both III and V. This feature of Class IV affects all of the statistical analysis discussed below.
8 
  Szreter’s Tables 6.2 through 6.6 appear to report the results of a more formal approach to his 
question, namely, an application of linear discriminant analysis (hereafter LDA). LDA is a classification 
 
6 One review of Fertility, Class and Gender makes the puzzling claim that Szreter’s analysis of the 1911 fertility 
survey shows that the social-class model is “… little better at predicting fertility behavior than a random selection of 
five groups (Carl Ipsen in Victorian Studies 40(1), Autumn 1996, pp. 156).  Szreter makes no such claim. 
7 The bins are .25 CEB wide, as in his figures. 
8 Class IV comprises 33 very heterogeneous occupation groups, including engine drivers, domestic and other 
gardeners, gas works service workers, domestic coachmen, grooms, postmen, shepherds, fishermen, some 




9 In our context, LDA uses the relationship between one variable (fertility) and a set of 
categories (class) to construct a classification rule. This classification rule seeks a separation between 
each class that minimizes the number of misclassifications of actual classes into predicted classes.  When 
applying LDA, a “misclassification” consists of an observation from the true Class III, for example, that 
is assigned to the predicted class IV.  
Table 2 reports an LDA exercise with results similar to Szreter’s. (Given that there are only minor 
differences between what he reports and what we were able to re-create, in the following we discuss his 
Table 6.4, rather than our Table 2). LDA allocates 23 of the 31 groups in actual Class I to the predicted 
Class I. It places a further 8 observations in the wrong category, with 6 in class II and another 2 in class 
III. Thus 8/31 or 26 percent are misclassified. As we would expect on the basis of Figure 2, LDA does not 
perform as well for Classes III and IV. Fifty-nine percent of the 44 observations in Class III are assigned 
to the wrong predicted social class. Class IV is even worse, with 73 percent in the wrong group. A glance 
at Figure 2 suggests the source of the problem: for a low value of CEB such as 3.3, there is little doubt 
that the occupation belongs in the predicted class I. But in other cases the overlap among the class 
distributions is so substantial that multiple classes are plausible, if not equally likely. A CEB value of 
about 5.1, for example, could belong in class II, III, or IV.  
Szreter then reports a weighted version of the LDA, which allows him to estimate the fraction of 
all couples that are misclassified. This important exercise reflects the different sizes of the occupational 
groups that form the observations. The smallest group (Class I’s “scientific pursuits”) has about 2400 
couples in England overall, while the largest, Class V’s “cartmen and carters – nonfarm” has some 181 
thousand couples. Thus a misclassification in the latter has greater implications for our understanding of 
fertility patterns.  Table 6.6 reports that about 52 percent of all couples are misclassified.
10 
 
9 We assume Szreter used LDA, but cannot precisely replicate his Table 6.4 using LDA. See Eisenbeis and Avery 
(1972) for an explanation. 
10 Only 39 percent of cells are misclassified; that is, cells with more couples are more likely to be misclassified. The 
weights Szreter uses do not correspond to the number of couples in each age at marriage/period of 
marriage/occupational group cell reported in the fertility survey. Rather, he weights by the total number of men with 
that occupation in England and Wales (Szreter 1996, p.303).  8 
 
                                                           
  Szreter views the LDA exercise as a rejection of the “professional model.” We disagree. First, his 
standard for rejection is unusual. A statistical model can be useful even if it does not fit perfectly. His 
LDA model implies that the class variables correctly allocate about half the English population to the 
correct discrete category. Many social scientists would be ecstatic if their models had such good 
predictive powers! Second, his conclusion that the model fails relies heavily on the binary criterion of 
“right class/wrong class.” Most misclassifications in his Table 6.4 are into neighboring social classes. 
Consider the 31 observations in class I. LDA assigns 23 to the predicted class I, and another 6 to the 
predicted class II. Thus 29/31 = 93 percent are in the correct predicted class or one of its neighbors. If we 
go through the table and compute the percentage of all cells that are assigned either to the right social 
class or to one of its neighbors, we find the fit is actually rather good. Our logic reflects Szreter’s own 
argument that the social classes are graded. If we think Class II belongs between Class I and Class III in 
some meaningful scale of status, as is presumed by the entire classification structure, then it is indeed 
relevant that most of the misclassifications from one social class appear in the predicted version of the 
class either above or below it. Applying this procedure to Table 6.6, we find that 88 percent of the 
population is classified into either the correct class or one of its immediate neighbors. There is no formal 
statistical basis for this procedure that we know of, but it does show that LDA does not assign 
occupations randomly, even when it is “wrong.”
11  
 
3. A different approach  
The approaches Szreter took do not, in our view, survive reexamination. We disagree particularly 
with his idea of what constitutes a useful statistical model. In our view, however, the most surprising 
 
11 A variant on the LDA approach yields a better fit than Szreter reports. The linear version of the model (upon 
which we surmise Szreter relied) assumes that the distribution of mean CEB within each class is normally 
distributed. This assumption is violated for all classes except class I. In addition, LDA, like all linear models, is 
sensitive to outliers. Note, for example, that nearly all occupations in Class I have a mean CEB of between 3.5 and 
4.5, but one has a mean CEB of over 5.5. An alternative but similar approach is to use the k
th nearest-neighbor (knn) 
technique, which is a nonparametric approach. This makes knn models less sensitive to a few unusual observations 
within a class. Experimenting with the knn model, we found a fit dramatically better than in the LDA model 
reported in Table 2. The fit is sensitive to the choice of k, but no choice of k<20 yields a fit as poor as the linear 
model’s. 9 
 
feature of his statistical analysis is the technique he does not mention or use, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). When we attempt to determine whether a model fits a given set of data, we are not so much 
interested in whether it can assign outcomes to specific predicted classes as we are in asking whether 
most of the variation in the outcome variable (fertility) follows the predictions implied by the model. The 
most natural way to approach this question is to ask about sources of variation in fertility. What fraction 
of the variation in fertility we observe in these 176 occupational categories reflects differences within a 
social-class, and what fraction reflects differences between the social classes? This question suggests the 
use of ANOVA or its close cousin, linear regression. To the extent that the latter type of variation 
predominates, it would imply that social class differences provide a good account of the couple-to-couple 
variations in marital fertility, or that the social-class model “fits” the 1911 survey data.  
ANOVA and LDA are closely related, and in fact one can view LDA as the reverse of ANOVA. 
In this section we are not really presenting new information as much as re-presenting it in a way that more 
closely corresponds to widely accepted social science notions of testing a behavioral hypothesis. 
Referring back to the distributions shown in Figure 2, LDA asks if it is possible to find a rule that 
distinguishes most observations for Class I from most observations for Class II. As is readily apparent, no 
such “clean” separation is possible, and, as we already know, LDA will place some Class II occupations 
in the predicted Class I and vice-versa. ANOVA treats that variation differently. Instead of asking 
whether it can classify the observations into five distinct groups, it asks whether there are in fact five 
distinct groups.  Note that Table 1 has already shown than Classes I-V are graded. If we can establish that 
there are five distinct groups in a statistical sense, then we have demonstrated the validity of the 
professional model as Szreter describes it. 
The answer is surprising in its divergence from the interpretation that Szreter gives to the LDA 
results: an unweighted analysis of variance (ANOVA) has an adjusted R
2 of .67. Weighting by the 
number of couples (as Szreter defines them) reduces that R
2 to about .65. Thus about two-thirds of all 
variation in fertility across couples occurs between social classes; in the imprecise parlance often used by 10 
 
                                                           
social scientists, social class “explains” about two-thirds of the variation in marital fertility.
12 A single-
factor model that achieves so much hardly can be called a failure. 
ANOVA also provides us with a better intuitive grasp of the problem posed by Class IV. We 
construct four pseudo-classes in which III and IV are combined. Using those pseudo-classes instead of the 
real classes, ANOVA reports an adjusted R
2, of, once again, .66. Our amalgamated scheme does not lose 
any explanatory power because it affects only that part of the class distribution that does not help to 
explain fertility in any case. Now we have a more complicated answer to the question, “In what sense 
does social class ‘explain’ fertility?” Knowing whether a couple was allocated to class I, II or V does 
matter, as does knowing whether it was in III or IV as opposed to one of the others. The differences 
between III and IV matter so little, however, that they can be combined into a single group without the 
loss of any explanatory power.  So part of the social-class model’s strength turns on the question of where 
we look in this hierarchy of “classes”.
13  
  Finally, a general way to determine whether the values in one sample are larger than the values in 
another is to ask whether the second distribution stochastically dominates the first.  If distribution A 
stochastically dominates distribution B, then for any x, FA(x)< FB(x), where F(x) denotes the cumulative 
distribution function. In Figure 3 we plot the (unsmoothed) cumulative distribution functions for each of 
the five classes. The figure shows that the distribution of mean CEB in each social class dominates that of 
 
12 This R
2 is estimated from observations that are themselves aggregated; all variation between couples but with an 
occupation group has been removed. Ordinarily this aggregation results in a R
2 much higher than is possible with 
individual-level data. Brown and Guinnane (2007) explain the aggregation issue in the context of the Princeton 
studies. As an example, consider Teitelbaum's contribution to the Princeton series, which is also on Britain. He 
reports (Table 7.2) a series of linear models with adjusted R
2  values ranging as high as .78. This is possible because 
his units of analysis are British counties. In another famous historical demographic study, the reported adjusted R
2 
values rarely exceed .05 (Preston and Haines, for example, Table 4.4). Preston and Haines are working with 
individual-level data, and the "unexplained" portion of the variation in the dependent variable includes much inter-
couple variation removed by aggregation in Szreter's approach.  
13 ANOVA corresponds to a linear regression model in which all regressors are dummies. If we estimate the model 
in this form, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that Class III and Class IV have the same conditional mean 
(F=2.17, with a probability of .143). This is just a restatement of the point made in the text. ANOVA could also be 
sensitive to parametric form. We re-estimated the model with the ranks (rather than values) of occupation-specific 
CEB as the dependent variables. This procedure is the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric  analogue of ANOVA. The 
results in ranks are nearly identical to those in levels. 11 
 
                                                           
the class “above” it.  Class II, for example, has higher fertility in this sense than Class I. The sole 
exception is that involving Class IV, which by now familiarly anomalous.
14 
The only problem with the “professional model” for Classes I-V appears to be a Class IV that 
really is not distinct from Class III. Szreter’s discussion of the way these classes were defined and used 
shows that to the extent there was a clear theory of class, the theory pertained to Classes I, III, and V, 
while Classes II and IV were afterthoughts. Class II nonetheless appears to have real explanatory power 
for fertility differentials. It is unfortunate that Szreter’s study did not explicitly focus on the problem with 
Class IV. Class IV is indeed a surprising amalgam of occupations. It would have been an interesting and 
valuable contribution to have worked out why the composition of Class IV failed to contribute to the 
otherwise valid account of marital fertility variation provided by the “professional” . 
In concluding this discussion of Chapter 6 we should emphasize two points.  First, our discussion 
of the ANOVAs stresses that the classes are indeed different. But Table 1 shows they are also graded, in 
the sense Szreter stresses: the mean CEB for Class I is less than for Class II, etc. Thus the model as 
Szreter defines it does not fail. Second, our efforts here follow the fundamental choices Szreter makes in 
his Chapter 6. We already noted that the 176 occupations we use in our analysis are those stressed in his 
work. He does not include Classes VI, VII, and VIII in his test of the professional model because he 
views them as having been excluded from the professional model on a priori grounds. He does report 
mean CEB for occupations grouped under these classes, however, and it is worth briefly considering their 
role in the argument.  Class VI comprises a diverse group of textile workers. Class VII is mostly coal 
miners. Class VIII is agricultural laborers. These three classes clearly do not fit the graded class scheme. 
The mean CEB for Class VI is 5.2 births (N=12), which would place it between Classes II and III. (Class 
VII’s mean CEB is 7.1, (N=4); for agricultural laborers, mean CEB is 6.7 for three occupational groups). 
Adding these three classes to our analysis does  not affect the main ANOVA model, however. Using the 
 
14 Class IV does stochastically dominate Class III at second order, which is a slightly weaker condition still implying 
that “most” of the distribution for Class IV is larger than for Class III. 12 
 
                                                           
full 195 occupations reflected in Classes I-VIII, we obtain an R
2 of .68.
15 Szreter (1996, p. 307) stresses 
that Classes VI-VIII demonstrate the professional model’s inherent “incoherence,” since they comprise 
large parts of the workforce and obviously do not fit the graded fertility scheme. Yet since they were not 
included in the statistical discussion reported in Chapter Six of Fertility, Class, and Gender, they are 
really not at issue in our re-analysis of his data. 
 
4. Szreter’s explanation 
  The heart of Fertility, Class, and Gender for later scholars has been the rejection of the social 
class model. This exercise cleared the way for Szreter’s preferred alternative, which is to argue that  
The idea of a neatly socially graded single event [the fertility decline] should be replaced by the 
picture of many geographically and chronologically disparate processes occurring in distinct 
contexts and for different reasons. It is because these have formed, overall, a chronologically 
overlapping sequence of such changes that this has produced the illusion at the aggregate, 
national level of a relatively smooth unitary process. This misapprehension needs to be 
recognized for what it is: an elementary statistical fallacy, an artifact created by aggregation 
(Szreter 1996, p.364). 
 
We have demonstrated, we believe, that there is no statistical fallacy.  But the question remains: what is 
the basis for his interpretation? 
We see it as follows: Szreter ordered all occupational groups (the observations) by the value of 
mean CEB.  He then notes what he sees as patterns in the “misclassifications.” A misclassification here 
amounts to an occupation from Class II, for example, that appears in the middle of occupations from 
Class I. He stresses two general forces in accounting for these patterns. First, couples’ fertility may reflect 
the influence of others with whom they share close social proximity. A good example is domestic indoor 
servants (class III, but with an average CEB of 4.01, well below the mean CEB of 5.77 for their class and 
 
15 Szreter (1996, pp.306-307) discusses an earlier paper by Michael Haines that is also based on the 1911 fertility 
survey. Haines (1989, Table 3) reports OLS regressions of fertility on social class, and concludes that “social class 
was a good predictor of differential fertility.” He uses Classes I-VIII and reports R
2  values similar to ours. Szreter 
claims that “Had Haines used his method to test only the five classes of the professional model, the proportion of 
variance explained would certainly have been lower, as reported in this exercise.” Our results show this is not true, 
as we find similar fits with just Classes I-V. Haines did not stress the class ordering of fertility that Szreter sees as 
central to the professional model. Szreter (1996, p.307) also notes that Haines forms his observations by combing all 
women married in a given period, regardless of their ages. We cannot say precisely how that practice affects Haines’ 
results, but given the similarity to our own, it does not seem to have been a source of great error. 13 
 
lower even than the mean for Class I). Szreter (1996, p.315) notes that these occupations are 
“predominantly composed of couples who lived in the direct employ and in close social contact with the 
most wealthy part of society, being their personal servants.” Szreter suggests that servants might have 
very low fertility because they spend so much time with others who have low fertility, and either learn 
from them the benefits of a smaller family or simply ape their social superiors. In other instances Szreter 
stresses geographic patterns. Thus, noting apparent differences among workers in the textile industry, he 
stresses that some are most common in Lancashire, while others are mostly in Yorkshire’s West Riding 
(Szreter 1996, p.317).  Lancashire and the West Riding have different fertility patterns for persons in the 
same class. 
  This discussion forms the basis for the common interpretation of his argument as asserting the 
fertility transition was not driven by socio-economic forces but the influence of other people in a place, 
whether that place is defined as a place of employment or a region. Thus what mattered was less a 
couple’s social or economic position as its participation in a “communication community.” That argument 
resonates with much social history and social-science over the past two decades, which has stressed the 
important of social interactions and various sorts of geographically-based spillover effects. Properly 
documented, the argument could well be the basis for important insights into the fertility transition in 
England and Wales. 
Yet the approach used in Chapter 7 (“Multiple fertility declines in Britain”) is not what social 
scientists usually have in mind in conducting statistical analysis, because it is entirely ad hoc.  A more 
useful analytical approach would be to specify, a priori, a set of forces one thinks affects marital fertility, 
and then to classify the occupational groups according to these forces. Thus Szreter might assign to each 
occupation a score reflecting the degree to which people in this occupation are in close contact with 
members of the upper classes. One could use statistical models to test whether this quality of an 
occupation has any power in explaining fertility differences. Similarly, one might explicitly model the 
role of local forces in driving fertility. From Table 45 of Part II one could compute the mean CEB 
measure discussed here for the urban and rural districts of every county in England and Wales. 14 
 
Unfortunately, this table does not further cross-classify fertility by occupation, so one could not construct 
from this table the information needed to undertake a fair test of Szreter’s “local social communications 
hypothesis.” Still, given his claim of multiple fertility declines, it he might well have made us of the 
available geographic information to document the existence of such declines.  
The absence of such analysis is puzzling because Szreter later undertakes one exploration that has 
precisely the character that seems to be indicated. His Table 7.2 reports correlations between fertility and 
three distinct measures of employment status. Here he defines a characteristic of each occupation that he 
thinks affects fertility, uses other census data to construct a measure of this characteristic, and then tests 
this measure’s relationship to measured fertility. But, unfortunately, the more widely noticed portions of  
Szreter’s effort to support his thesis rests on the  procedure described above. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Szreter’s impressive first book made a significant mark in the historiography of the European 
fertility transition, in large measure because he claimed to have shown that a “professional model” of 
British fertility in 1911 did not fit the available evidence. Others expanded upon this claim to argue that 
he had shown socio-economic differences were not an important part of the British fertility transition. We 
have shown this finding to be incorrect. Using Szreter’s own data and simply reworking the statistical 
analysis he presents as a test of the professional model, we demonstrate that by conventional criteria a   
five-part division of the British population by social class explains the observed variations in marital 
fertility extremely well. The only serious weakness in the model’s power is Class IV, which appears no 
different from Class III. Szreter rightly stresses that the graded class scheme excludes large parts of the 
British population, and that many of these excluded couples (Classes VI-VIII) do not fit the professional 
model. But these couples are not relevant to our critique; Szreter did not include them in the analysis at 
issue here.  
  The manuscript schedules from the 1911 census of England and Wales will be available soon, and 
their use will support tests of more complicated multivariate hypotheses. Szreter argued that social class 15 
 
                                                           
did not explain fertility differentials. We have shown to the contrary that it did. But this is a one-factor 
model, and begs several different questions. Social class might well be correlated with some other trait 
that better explains fertility. More likely, it might be found that, as Szreter suggested, the influence of 
social class is slight once we have accounted for other causal forces such as the nature of the local 
community. None of these or other factors can be identified from aggregated data of the sort published by 
the census, which is why individual-level data are so important for the study of fertility. 
  What are the larger stakes in this discussion? Fertility, Class, and Gender occupies an important 
place in the received understanding of the European fertility transition. For decades scholars have been 
speculating about and arguing over the suspected causes of the European fertility transition. Much of this 
debate has been framed around Carlsson (1969)’s distinction between “innovation” on the one hand and 
“adjustment” on the other.  Although not strictly correct, most scholars associate innovation with 
ideational forces and adjustment with a changing economic and social environment. Princeton 
University’s European Fertility Project famously argued that social and economic forces played little or 
no role in the transition (Coale and Watkins (1986)). For a while that view came close to becoming the 
consensus position, but recent research has stressed the view that the Princeton findings were largely an 
artifact of faulty statistical methods (Brown and Guinnane (2007)).
16  Szreter’s book sometimes has been 
unfairly portrayed as similar in argument to that advanced by the work of the Princeton Project. 
Nevertheless, although it is a distinct intellectual contribution, its conclusions for the case of the British 
transition were aligned with and appeared to reinforce the Princeton Project’s position. As we have shown 
here, Szreter’s conclusion does not survive re-analysis of his data.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for AM2/81-85, by social class 
Number of children ever-born  Social class  Number of groups 
Mean Minimum Maximum Inter-quartile  range
I 31  4.11  3.16  5.66  .69 
II 40  4.92  3.55  6.06  .88 
III 44  5.77  4.01  7.04  .66 
IV 33  5.97  4.49  7.03  1.04 
V 28  6.56  5.76  7.29  .53 
Note: Computed from the fertility measure reported in Szreter (1996, Appendix C) 18 
 
 
Table 2: Linear discriminant analysis 
                                                    
 Predicted  class 
 










































































Note: The first number in each row is the number of observations, and the second is the corresponding 
row percentage. Source is as in Table 1.  
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Note: This figure approximates Szreter (1986, Figure 6.6) 
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Note: The figures are kernel estimates of the density for each class. They are plotted on the same 
x-axis. 
 
Source: Szreter (1986, Appendix C). 
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